Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games (Q910349): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90009-9 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 14:52, 20 June 2024

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Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
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    Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games (English)
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    A class of signaling games is studied in which a unique universally divine equilibrium outcome exists. We identify a monotonicity property under which a variation of universal divinity is generically equivalent to strategic stability. Further assumptions guarantee the existence of a unique universally divine outcome.
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    uniqueness
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    signaling games
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    strategic stability
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