Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide? (Q1958948): Difference between revisions

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-Salvador Barberá
@@ Property / author: Salvador Barberá / rank @@
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+Salvador Barberá
@@ Property / author: Salvador Barberá / rank @@
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+MaRDI publication profile
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+W2151470090
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes
@@ Property / cites work: A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes / rank @@
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+Strategy-Proof Exchange
@@ Property / cites work: Strategy-Proof Exchange / rank @@
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+Voting by Committees
@@ Property / cites work: Voting by Committees / rank @@
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+Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
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+The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
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+On Coalition Incentive Compatibility
@@ Property / cites work: On Coalition Incentive Compatibility / rank @@
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+Special domains and nonmanipulability
@@ Property / cites work: Special domains and nonmanipulability / rank @@
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+Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
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+Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
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+Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
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+On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
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+Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
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+Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
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+Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
@@ Property / cites work: Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange / rank @@
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+Q4196192
@@ Property / cites work: Q4196192 / rank @@
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+Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition-proof
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+Strategy-proof location on a network
@@ Property / cites work: Strategy-proof location on a network / rank @@
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+Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
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