Majority decisions when abstention is possible (Q764902): Difference between revisions
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Property / author: Paul B. Larson / rank | |||
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Property / arXiv ID: 1003.2756 / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Voting paradoxes and digraphs realizations / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Q5509547 / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: On \(\lambda\)-majority voting paradoxes / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: What majority decisions are possible / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: The Voting Problem / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 00:40, 5 July 2024
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English | Majority decisions when abstention is possible |
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Majority decisions when abstention is possible (English)
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16 March 2012
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Consider a family of choice functions on pairs from a given finite set of, say, candidates for an office. Call each of such functions a voter. The question addressed in this paper is: what choice functions agree, on every pair, with the majority of some finite subfamily of the voters? This question is here addressed for the general case of voters being allowed to abstain. Aside from the trivial case, the possible families of (partial) choice functions break into three cases in terms of the functions that can be generated by majority decision. In one of these, cycles along the lines of Condorcet's paradox are avoided. In another, all partial choice functions can be represented.
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choice function
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majority decision
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Condorcet's paradox
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tournament
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