Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem (Q431230): Difference between revisions
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An axiomatic framework is provided to analyze the following problem. A waste disposal facility has to be sited in one of several districts producing different amounts of waste. The construction cost of the facility depends on where it is sited. When a district accepts the facility, it bears a disutility. The problem is to choose a siting district and to share the construction cost while considering fair compensation for the siting district. A fair pricing rule is one that selects a district so as to minimize the social loss, applies a negative price to waste according to the social loss involved, and provides full compensation to the siting district. It is shown that this rule is the unique rule that satisfies certain requirements of efficiency, fairness, and robustness regarding the strategic transfers of waste. The nearly robustness of this rule to the misrepresentation of disutility information is also established. | |||
Property / review text: An axiomatic framework is provided to analyze the following problem. A waste disposal facility has to be sited in one of several districts producing different amounts of waste. The construction cost of the facility depends on where it is sited. When a district accepts the facility, it bears a disutility. The problem is to choose a siting district and to share the construction cost while considering fair compensation for the siting district. A fair pricing rule is one that selects a district so as to minimize the social loss, applies a negative price to waste according to the social loss involved, and provides full compensation to the siting district. It is shown that this rule is the unique rule that satisfies certain requirements of efficiency, fairness, and robustness regarding the strategic transfers of waste. The nearly robustness of this rule to the misrepresentation of disutility information is also established. / rank | |||
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Property / reviewed by | |||
Property / reviewed by: Giacomo Bonanno / rank | |||
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID | |||
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91C99 / rank | |||
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Property / zbMATH DE Number | |||
Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6050571 / rank | |||
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Property / zbMATH Keywords | |||
NIMBY (not in my backyard) | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: NIMBY (not in my backyard) / rank | |||
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market design | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: market design / rank | |||
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Property / zbMATH Keywords | |||
nearly robustness to strategic manipulation | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: nearly robustness to strategic manipulation / rank | |||
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proportional rule | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: proportional rule / rank | |||
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manipulation game | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: manipulation game / rank | |||
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core | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: core / rank | |||
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Property / MaRDI profile type | |||
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank | |||
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Property / full work available at URL | |||
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0562-x / rank | |||
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Property / OpenAlex ID | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2016842189 / rank | |||
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links / mardi / name | links / mardi / name | ||
Latest revision as of 10:28, 5 July 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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English | Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem |
scientific article |
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Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem (English)
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26 June 2012
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An axiomatic framework is provided to analyze the following problem. A waste disposal facility has to be sited in one of several districts producing different amounts of waste. The construction cost of the facility depends on where it is sited. When a district accepts the facility, it bears a disutility. The problem is to choose a siting district and to share the construction cost while considering fair compensation for the siting district. A fair pricing rule is one that selects a district so as to minimize the social loss, applies a negative price to waste according to the social loss involved, and provides full compensation to the siting district. It is shown that this rule is the unique rule that satisfies certain requirements of efficiency, fairness, and robustness regarding the strategic transfers of waste. The nearly robustness of this rule to the misrepresentation of disutility information is also established.
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NIMBY (not in my backyard)
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market design
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nearly robustness to strategic manipulation
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proportional rule
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manipulation game
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core
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