Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem (Q306741): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Importer (talk | contribs)
Created a new Item
 
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
(4 intermediate revisions by 4 users not shown)
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B80 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / zbMATH DE Number
 
Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6621241 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
single-dippedness
Property / zbMATH Keywords: single-dippedness / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
strong Nash equilibrium
Property / zbMATH Keywords: strong Nash equilibrium / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
minimax theorem
Property / zbMATH Keywords: minimax theorem / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
core solution
Property / zbMATH Keywords: core solution / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
strong Nash implementation
Property / zbMATH Keywords: strong Nash implementation / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.05.001 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2361205967 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3254691 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide? / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategy-proofness and ``median voters'' / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Manipulation of the Walrasian mechanism in production economies with unbounded short-selling / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On the existence of strong Nash equilibria / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4881599 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Toward Natural Implementation / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Games of fair division / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q5844986 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules / rank
 
Normal rank
links / mardi / namelinks / mardi / name
 

Latest revision as of 11:49, 12 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
scientific article

    Statements

    Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    1 September 2016
    0 references
    single-dippedness
    0 references
    strong Nash equilibrium
    0 references
    minimax theorem
    0 references
    core solution
    0 references
    strong Nash implementation
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references

    Identifiers