On strongly consistent social choice functions (Q687046): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 11:52, 30 July 2024
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English | On strongly consistent social choice functions |
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On strongly consistent social choice functions (English)
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2 December 1993
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The paper analyses strongly consistent social choice functions (SCF) i.e., SCF's which yield a strong equilibrium for every preference profile of individuals. Similar to the elimination procedure introduced by \textit{B. Peleg} [Econometrica 46, 153-161 (1978; Zbl 0373.90002)] the paper introduces the key notion of an elimination scheme. A distribution of coalitions power (a blocking) is said to be eliminable, if an elimination scheme exists for every preference profile. In case a blocking is eliminable, each selector of its core correspondence is shown to be a strongly consistent SCF. Several characterizations and examples of eliminable blockings are provided.
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strongly consistent social choice functions
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strong equilibrium
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elimination scheme
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eliminable blockings
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