On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties (Q839623): Difference between revisions

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-Michel Le Breton
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+Michel Le Breton
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+MaRDI publication profile
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+W2113215903
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+Q3254691
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+Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
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+A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes
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+An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
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+Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
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+Generalized median voter schemes and committees
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+Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
@@ Property / cites work: Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications / rank @@
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+Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
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+Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
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+Manipulations by coalitions under asymmetric information: The case of Groves mechanisms
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+The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree
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+The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
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+Single-peaked orders on a tree
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+Implementability and Horizontal Equity Imply No-Envy
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
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+Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
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+On Coalition Incentive Compatibility
@@ Property / cites work: On Coalition Incentive Compatibility / rank @@
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+A crash course in implementation theory
@@ Property / cites work: A crash course in implementation theory / rank @@
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+Special domains and nonmanipulability
@@ Property / cites work: Special domains and nonmanipulability / rank @@
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+Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
@@ Property / cites work: Collusion Under Asymmetric Information / rank @@
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+A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
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+Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
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+Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
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+Q4311891
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+Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
@@ Property / cites work: Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods / rank @@
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+Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
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+Convex Analysis
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
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+Strategy-proof location on a network
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+Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
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+Publication:839623