A core of voting games with improved foresight (Q732925): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.04.003 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2064909507 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 01:02, 2 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
A core of voting games with improved foresight
scientific article

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    A core of voting games with improved foresight (English)
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    15 October 2009
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    voting games
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    core
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    stability set
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    foresighted core
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    P-core
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    no-regret property
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    Identifiers