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Latest revision as of 10:54, 28 August 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7083499
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Stable Matching in Large Economies
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7083499

    Statements

    Stable Matching in Large Economies (English)
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    19 July 2019
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    two-sided matching
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    stability
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    complementarity
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    strategy-proofness
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    large economy
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