On some combinatorial problems arising in the theory of voting games (Q1813696): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Set profile property. |
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs) Changed an Item |
||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: The capacity of a committee / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: n-Person games with only 1, n? 1, and n-person coalitions / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: \(n\)-person games with only 1, \(n-1\), and \(n\)-person permissible coalitions / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Q3677437 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Stability of decision systems under majority rule / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Revision as of 16:06, 14 May 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | On some combinatorial problems arising in the theory of voting games |
scientific article |
Statements
On some combinatorial problems arising in the theory of voting games (English)
0 references
25 June 1992
0 references
This paper complements the paper by the author and the reviewer [Int. J. Game Theory 19, No. 2, 111-127 (1990; Zbl 0726.90008)]. It gives the conditions on the size of the set of alternatives that guarantee the non- emptiness of the stability set for some quota voting games. In particular, games where the quota is equal to the number of voters minus one, majority games and qualified majority games are considered.
0 references
core
0 references
non-emptiness of the stability set
0 references
quota voting games
0 references
qualified majority games
0 references
