An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria (Q5932220): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Latest revision as of 16:56, 3 June 2024
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1595376
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
---|---|---|---|
English | An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1595376 |
Statements
An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria (English)
0 references
1 February 2002
0 references
The author [``Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria'', Soc. Choice Welfare 14, 439-447 (1997; Zbl 0881.90012)], considered a decision making problem where there is a set of options and a finite number of agents with preferences defined over the set of options, and obtained a necessary and sufficient condition for double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria. One problem with the condition is that it is difficult to apply it directly to a given (social choice) correspondence. In the present paper the author provides an algorithm which helps to determine whether or not a correspondence satisfies the condition.
0 references
double implementation
0 references
Nash equilibria
0 references
strong Nash equilibria
0 references
algorithm
0 references
0 references