On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games (Q2640470): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Set profile property. |
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs) Changed an Item |
||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: On Repeated Games with Complete Information / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Latest revision as of 14:31, 21 June 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games |
scientific article |
Statements
On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games (English)
0 references
1991
0 references
We show that any feasible, individually rational payoffs of an infinitely repeated game can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs if the discount factor is close enough to one even if mixed strategies are not observable and public randomizations are not available.
0 references
folk theorem
0 references
subgame perfect equilibrium
0 references
public randomizations
0 references
