Autonomous coalitions

DOI10.1007/S10479-015-1951-0zbMath1358.91012OpenAlexW3192486994MaRDI QIDQ256638

Michel Grabisch, Stéphane Gonzalez

Publication date: 9 March 2016

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-015-1951-0

zbMATH Keywords

balancednesscorecooperative gameaspiration coreautonomous coalitionsc-corecoalition formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (5)

Characterization sets for the nucleolus in balanced games ⋮ Optimal deterrence of cooperation ⋮ Fair profit division ⋮ An empirical distribution of the number of subsets in the core partitions of hedonic games ⋮ Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: a dynamic coalitional stability perspective

Cites Work

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• Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games
• Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an \(n\)-person game
• On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
• Orderings, excess functions, and the nucleolus
• The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
• Axiomatizing core extensions
• On the vertices of the \(k\)-additive core
• USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION
• NONEMPTY CORE-TYPE SOLUTIONS OVER BALANCED COALITIONS IN TU-GAMES
• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games

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