Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes

DOI10.1007/S11238-015-9501-4zbMATH Open1378.91076OpenAlexW2176132798MaRDI QIDQ266525FDOQ266525

Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, Mostapha Diss

Publication date: 13 April 2016

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/22903

zbMATH Keywords

transitivityprobabilitymajorities based on difference of votestriple-acyclicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Condorcet's paradox
• The probability of Condorcet cycles and super majority rules
• Probabilities of preferences and cycles with super majority rules
• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
• Collective transitivity in majorities based on difference in support
• Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
• The forgotten decision rules: majority rules based on difference of votes
• Triple-acyclicity in majorities based on difference in support
• Majority decisions based on difference of votes
• Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives
• Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
• Some further characterizations for the forgotten voting rules

Cited In (6)

• Triple-acyclicity in majorities based on difference in support
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• What majority decisions are possible
• Convergence results for unanimous voting

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