Resource allocation games: a compromise stable extension of bankruptcy games

DOI10.1007/s00186-013-0437-6zbMath1280.91013OpenAlexW2104844012MaRDI QIDQ376726

Soesja Grundel, P. E. M. Borm, Herbert Hamers

Publication date: 19 November 2013

Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-013-0437-6

zbMATH Keywords

nucleolusbankruptcy gamescompromise stabilityresource allocation games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items

Resource allocation games: a compromise stable extension of bankruptcy games ⋮ Resource allocation problems with concave reward functions ⋮ Sharing pollution permits under welfare upper bounds

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