A dynamic game of reputation and economic performances in nondemocratic regimes

DOI10.1007/S13235-012-0050-YzbMath1276.91030OpenAlexW2141244322MaRDI QIDQ385167

Chee Kian Leong

Publication date: 29 November 2013

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0050-y

zbMATH Keywords

reputationeconomic performancenondemocracy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Dynamic games (91A25)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Bad Reputation
• The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear
• Contraction Mappings in the Theory Underlying Dynamic Programming
• Who Wants a Good Reputation?

This page was built for publication: A dynamic game of reputation and economic performances in nondemocratic regimes