Prizes and patents: using market signals to provide incentives for innovations
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Publication:413512
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.04.004zbMath1258.91170OpenAlexW3124685859MaRDI QIDQ413512
Aleh Tsyvinski, V. V. Chari, Mikhail Golosov
Publication date: 7 May 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.21034/wp.673
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items (2)
Cites Work
- Dynamic analysis of patent policy in an endogenous growth model
- Patent policy in an endogenous growth model
- Patents in a model of endogenous growth
- Competition, Imitation and Growth with Step-by-Step Innovation
- On the Performance of Patents
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- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction
- Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights
- Patent Length and the Rate of Innovation
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