Sustainable coalitions in the commons

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.006zbMath1237.91172OpenAlexW2052070798MaRDI QIDQ419415

Jean-Christophe Péreau, Luc Doyen

Publication date: 18 May 2012

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://cahiersdugretha.u-bordeaux.fr/2009/2009-15.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (6)

Maximin, viability and sustainability ⋮ The tragedy of open ecosystems ⋮ Ecological-economic modelling for the sustainable management of biodiversity ⋮ Computation of viability kernels: a case study of by-catch fisheries ⋮ Stochastic differential game for management of non-renewable fishery resource under model ambiguity ⋮ Differential Game Model for Sustainability Multi-Fishery

Cites Work

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• Dynamic Cournot-competitive harvesting of a common pool resource
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• Community enforcement of fisheries effort restrictions.
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• GAME-THEORETIC RESOURCE MODELING
• COALITION FORMATION IN STRADDLING STOCK FISHERIES: A PARTITION FUNCTION APPROACH
• SHARING THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION IN HIGH SEAS FISHERIES: A CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION GAME APPROACH
• A COALITION APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES IN THE PRESENCE OF EXTERNALITIES
• SHARING THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION IN THE NORWEGIAN SPRING-SPAWNING HERRING FISHERY
• Differential Games Through Viability Theory: Old and Recent Results
• RESTRICTED COALITIONS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF REGIONAL FISHERIES ORGANIZATIONS

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