Stackelberg equilibria in managerial delegation games

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2011.02.021zbMath1237.91150OpenAlexW2012583337MaRDI QIDQ421516

Fabian Berr

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.02.021

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryeconomicscontinuous optimizationstrategic delegationmanagerial incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (5)

Stackelberg leadership and managerial delegation under hyperbolic demand ⋮ Beyond myopic best response (in Cournot competition) ⋮ Vertical product differentiation, managerial delegation and social welfare in a vertically-related market ⋮ On noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in the multiple leader-follower game ⋮ Unnamed Item

Cites Work

• Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly
• Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly
• On the uniqueness of Nash equilibria
• Incentives and individual motivation in supervised work groups
• Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted
• The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields
• Relative performance evaluation and contract externalities
• Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games

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