First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk
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Publication:425709
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2011.06.008zbMath1239.91069MaRDI QIDQ425709
Pierre-Henri Morand, François Maréchal
Publication date: 8 June 2012
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.06.008
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Related Items
Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions, Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective, A first-price sealed-bid asymmetric auction when two bidders have respective CRRA and general utility functions
Cites Work
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