On strategic stability in discontinuous games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.06.007zbMath1251.91007OpenAlexW2124796683MaRDI QIDQ425713

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

Publication date: 8 June 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.06.007

zbMATH Keywords

strategic stabilityinfinite gametrembling-hand perfect equilibriumnormal-form game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (7)

Inefficient stage Nash is not stable ⋮ ON EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENT FOR DISCONTINUOUS GAMES ⋮ On equilibrium refinements in supermodular games ⋮ Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games ⋮ On strategic stability in discontinuous games ⋮ On essential, (strictly) perfect equilibria ⋮ Stability of fixed points of set-valued mappings and strategic stability of Nash equilibria

Cites Work

• On strategic stability in discontinuous games
• On the existence of pure-strategy perfect equilibrium in discontinuous games
• Essential equilibria in normal-form games
• Essential stability in games with infinitely many pure strategies
• Essential equilibria of \(n\)-person noncooperative games
• Strategically stable equilibria in games with infinitely many pure strategies
• The existence of perfect equilibrium in discontinuous games
• Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in compact games
• Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games
• On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games

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