Inverse Stackelberg public goods game with multiple hierarchies under global and local information structures
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Publication:467489
DOI10.1007/s10957-013-0475-5zbMath1309.91036OpenAlexW1969980783MaRDI QIDQ467489
Publication date: 3 November 2014
Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-013-0475-5
Stackelberg equilibriumequilibriumNash equilibriumpublic goods gameinformation structureinverse Stackelberg gamemultiple hierarchiesstrict TFT
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