Risk aversion in auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders: a ``desensitizer from uncertainty

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.010zbMath1217.91074OpenAlexW1965791594MaRDI QIDQ553869

Sandra Orozco-Alemán, Felix Munoz-Garcia

Publication date: 28 July 2011

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.010

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionfirst-price auctionsasymmetrically informed biddersunknown valuations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
• Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Multidimensional private value auctions
• Optimal auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction

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