A prudent characterization of the ranked pairs rule
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Publication:733778
DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0319-7zbMATH Open1184.91086OpenAlexW2058421153MaRDI QIDQ733778FDOQ733778
Publication date: 19 October 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0319-7
Cites Work
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- Complete independence of clones in the ranked pairs rule
- Ordinal ranking methods for multicriterion decision making
- A comparison between the prudent order and the ranking obtained with Borda's, Copeland's, Slater's and Kemeny's rules
- Refinements of the maximum approach to decision-making in a fuzzy environment
- A characterization of the prudent order preference function
- Prudent \(k\)-choice functions: Properties and algorithms
- Theoretical elements of comparison among ordinal discrete multicriteria methods
Cited In (4)
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