Capacity precommitment, communication, and collusive pricing: theoretical benchmark and experimental evidence

DOI10.1007/S00182-020-00718-0zbMath1444.91095OpenAlexW3125598037MaRDI QIDQ776854

Alexandra Zaby, Manfred Stadler, Güth, Werner

Publication date: 13 July 2020

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/190813

zbMATH Keywords

experimental economicscollusioncapacity-price competitionintra-play communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
• Capacity choices and price competition in experimental markets
• Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture
• What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence
• Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints

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