Winner-weaken-loser-strengthen rule leads to optimally cooperative interdependent networks

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Publication:783436

DOI10.1007/S11071-019-04772-6zbMath1437.91077OpenAlexW2913956214WikidataQ128526649 ScholiaQ128526649MaRDI QIDQ783436

Chen Chu, Haoran Meng, Zhen Wang, Yini Geng, Stefano Boccaletti, Chen Shen, Matjaž Perc, Lei Shi

Publication date: 4 August 2020

Published in: Nonlinear Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11071-019-04772-6





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