Efficient learning equilibrium

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2004.04.013zbMath1086.68110OpenAlexW2012347046MaRDI QIDQ814627

Moshe Tennenholtz, Ronen I. Brafman

Publication date: 7 February 2006

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2004.04.013

zbMATH Keywords

EfficiencyStochastic gamesEx-post equilibriumRepeated gamesLearning equilibriumMulti-agent learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Uses Software

• R-MAX

Cites Work

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