Cartel stability in a delivered pricing oligopoly

DOI10.1007/s00712-005-0150-xzbMath1108.91338OpenAlexW2093183649MaRDI QIDQ811993

Noriaki Matsushima, Toshihiro Matsumura

Publication date: 23 January 2006

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-005-0150-x

zbMATH Keywords

spatial price discriminationtacit collusionanti-trust

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60)

Related Items (4)

Profitable collusion on costs: a spatial model ⋮ Mixed oligopolies and collusion ⋮ Does price discrimination make collusion less likely? A delivered pricing model ⋮ Spatial price discrimination in the unidirectional Hotelling model with elastic demand

Cites Work

• Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Tacit collusion in a spatial model with delivered pricing
• Tacit collusion in differentiated Cournot games
• Standardization and the stability of collusion
• Does Cournot competition yield spatial agglomeration?
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Intertemporal Product Choice and Its Effects on Collusive Firm Behavior
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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