Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.005zbMath1197.90277MaRDI QIDQ844917

Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.005

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic mechanism design; sequential assignment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

60K35: Interacting random processes; statistical mechanics type models; percolation theory

90B80: Discrete location and assignment

91B44: Economics of information

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