Pure strategy equilibria in games with countable actions

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2006.09.008zbMath1280.91037OpenAlexW2092779040MaRDI QIDQ878005

Zhixiang Zhang, Haomiao Yu

Publication date: 4 May 2007

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.09.008

zbMATH Keywords

private informationlarge gamescountable actionsdistribution of correspondencesNash equilibrium in pure strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items (9)

Fuzzy games with a countable space of actions and applications to systems of generalized quasi-variational inequalities ⋮ Pareto refinements of pure-strategy equilibria in games with public and private information ⋮ Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games: characterization and existence ⋮ A link between sequential semi-anonymous nonatomic games and their large finite counterparts ⋮ Large games with a bio-social typology ⋮ Rationalizability in large games ⋮ Location of Nash equilibria: A Riemannian geometrical approach ⋮ On games with incomplete information and the Dvoretsky-Wald-Wolfowitz theorem with countable partitions ⋮ Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games

Cites Work

• On a private information game without pure strategy equilibria
• Non-cooperative games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces
• On the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
• Distributional properties of correspondences on Loeb spaces
• Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide
• Pure strategies in games with private information
• The Dvoretzky-Wald-Wolfowitz theorem and purification in atomless finite-action games
• Relations among certain ranges of vector measures
• Private Information and Pure-Strategy Equilibria
• Representation of systems of measurable sets
• Regular Conditional Expectations of Correspondences
• Integrals of Set-Valued Functions with a Countable Range
• Elimination of Randomization in Certain Problems of Statistics and of the Theory of Games
• Elimination of Randomization in Certain Statistical Decision Procedures and Zero-Sum Two-Person Games

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