Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities
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Publication:960277
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.001zbMath1151.91456MaRDI QIDQ960277
Publication date: 16 December 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.001
91A10: Noncooperative games
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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Cites Work
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