A constructive approach to sequential Nash equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.ipl.2005.09.010zbMath1179.91025OpenAlexW2167653210MaRDI QIDQ1045892

René Vestergaard

Publication date: 18 December 2009

Published in: Information Processing Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2005.09.010

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaautomatic theorem provingconstructivity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (5)

On the use (and abuse) of logic in game theory ⋮ Acyclic Preferences and Existence of Sequential Nash Equilibria: A Formal and Constructive Equivalence ⋮ Recycling proof patterns in Coq: case studies ⋮ Formalizing the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein pricing of European derivatives in Isabelle/HOL ⋮ ``Backward coinduction, Nash equilibrium and the rationality of escalation

Uses Software

• Coq

Cites Work

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Handbook of game theory with economic applications. Vol. 3
• Non-cooperative games
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
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