Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria are competitive in a repeated economy

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(82)90064-3zbMath0498.90010OpenAlexW2024968525MaRDI QIDQ1171495

Sergiu Hart, Mordecai Kurz

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90064-3

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaPareto optimal allocationsfinite exchange economyfamily of strategic gamesrepeated economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (3)

Nash equilibria of over-the-counter bargaining for insurance risk redistributions: the role of a regulator ⋮ A condition guaranteeing that the Nash alloation is Walrasian ⋮ Policies over time and Pareto optimality

Cites Work

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• On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
• Saddle points of Hamiltonian systems in convex problems of Lagrange
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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