Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(91)90015-7zbMath0753.90019OpenAlexW2092096115MaRDI QIDQ1198180

Torben Tranæs, Ebbe Hendon

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90015-7

zbMATH Keywords

matchingbargainingsubgame perfect equilibriumreservation priceinefficient equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Decentralised bilateral trading, competition for bargaining partners and the ``law of one price ⋮ One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable ⋮ A note on three-player noncooperative bargaining with restricted pairwise meetings ⋮ Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities ⋮ Rubinstein auctions: On competition for bargaining partners ⋮ Why are idiosyncratic goods produced to order?

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
• Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

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