A solution concept for \(n\)-person noncooperative games

DOI10.1007/BF01761604zbMath0354.90097MaRDI QIDQ1236976

John C. Harsanyi

Publication date: 1976

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A06: (n)-person games, (n>2)

Related Items

A best-response approach for equilibrium selection in two-player generalized Nash equilibrium problems, On the inconsistency of certain axioms on solution concepts for non- cooperative games, A remark on the Harsanyi-Selten theory of equilibrium selection, Equilibrium selection in a bargaining problem with transaction costs, Analysis of a family of two-person bargaining games with incomplete information, Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory. I: Theoretical preliminaries, Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory. II: Analysis of specific bargaining games, An algorithmic approach toward the tracing procedure for bi-matrix games, Introspection and equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) matrix games, Polytope games, How to select a solution in generalized Nash equilibrium problems, An algorithm for equilibrium selection in generalized Nash equilibrium problems

Cites Work

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n- person noncooperative games
• Non-cooperative games
• The Bargaining Problem
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Unnamed Item