Harsanyi's social aggregation theorem and the weak Pareto principle

DOI10.1007/BF00182506zbMath0774.90009MaRDI QIDQ1260626

John A. Weymark

Publication date: 31 August 1993

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Harsanyi's theoremsocial aggregationweak Pareto principlePareto indifference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (12)

Restricted increases in risk aversion and their application ⋮ Variable-population extensions of social aggregation theorems ⋮ Harsanyi's utilitarianism via linear programming ⋮ Scoring indices, top-truncated preferences, and splitting invariance ⋮ Tailored recommendations ⋮ Representation and aggregation of preferences under uncertainty ⋮ A note on affine aggregation ⋮ Utilitarianism with and without expected utility ⋮ Separate aggregation of beliefs and values under ambiguity ⋮ Fully Bayesian aggregation ⋮ Social decision for a measure society ⋮ The paradox of the Bayesian experts and state-dependent utility theory

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