Network mechanisms, informational efficiency, and hierarchies

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2375zbMath0911.90112OpenAlexW1973926382MaRDI QIDQ1268596

Stefan Reichelstein, Thomas Marschak

Publication date: 5 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2375

zbMATH Keywords

communication costsprice mechanismsnetwork mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (6)

Convention evolution in organizations and markets ⋮ Economics of leadership and hierarchy ⋮ Mathematical models of formation of rational organizational hierarchies ⋮ Systems of Bounded Rational Agents with Information-Theoretic Constraints ⋮ Network mechanisms, informational efficiency, and hierarchies ⋮ A methodology for analyzing decision networks, based on information theory

Cites Work

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• Approximating a function by choosing a covering of its domain and k points from its range
• The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely
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• Network mechanisms, informational efficiency, and hierarchies
• The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing
• A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes
• Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design
• Game Forms with Minimal Message Spaces
• The Firm as a Communication Network
• Convex Analysis
• A Tatonement Process for Public Goods
• Real-time decentralized information processing and returns to scale
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