On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions
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Publication:1268642
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0628zbMath0911.90128OpenAlexW2078290668MaRDI QIDQ1268642
Robert W. Rosenthal, Maria Angeles de Frutos
Publication date: 5 May 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4418
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
- Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
- Bottom-fishing and declining prices in sequential auctions
- Simultaneous auctions with synergies and common values
- The declining price anomaly
- Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
- A Model in which an Increase in the Number of Sellers Leads to a Higher Price
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
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