Decreasing serial cost sharing under economies of scale

DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2393zbMath0911.90137OpenAlexW2123013231MaRDI QIDQ1270061

Maria Angeles de Frutos

Publication date: 5 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4414

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcost sharingdecreasing serial mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (17)

The \(a\)-serial cost sharing rule ⋮ Lorenz comparison between increasing serial and Shapley value cost-sharing rules ⋮ Recent developments in the queueing problem ⋮ Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: characterization in the two-agent case ⋮ The implications of the ranking axiom for discrete cost sharing methods ⋮ Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods. ⋮ Allocation inequality in cost sharing problem ⋮ Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance ⋮ Cost Sharing in Production Economies ⋮ Decreasing serial cost sharing: an axiomatic characterization ⋮ Mixed serial cost sharing. ⋮ Shared network investment ⋮ Bayesian serial cost sharing ⋮ The self-dual serial cost-sharing rule ⋮ Stability and fairness in the job scheduling problem ⋮ The \(\alpha \)-serial cost-sharing rule ⋮ Uniqueness of equilibrium in cost sharing games

Cites Work

• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• An existence theorem for the core of a productive economy with increasing returns
• The overlapping-generations model. I: The case of pure exchange without money
• Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
• Welfare bounds in the cooperative production problem
• Average cost pricing versus serial cost sharing: An axiomatic comparison
• Cost sharing under increasing returns: A comparison of simple mechanisms
• On the uniqueness of equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly and other games
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Serial Cost Sharing
• Monotone Comparative Statics

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