An equivalence principle for perfectly competitive economies

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2273zbMath0892.90033MaRDI QIDQ1368874

Pradeep Dubey, Abraham Neyman

Publication date: 1 October 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/0eb64c9ca91615a47160d7857b4c5948f9374217

zbMATH Keywords

axiomatic characterization; competitive-core-value correspondence; smooth, non-atomic economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B50: General equilibrium theory

Related Items

Private value allocations in large economies with differential information, Acceptable and Walrasian allocations, Payoffs in nondifferentiable perfectly competitive TU economies, The asymptotic nucleolus of large monopolistic market games, Payoffs in exact TU economies

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