An extension of a theorem of von Neumann and Morgenstern with an application to social choice theory

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(00)00047-1zbMath0966.91030WikidataQ57944308 ScholiaQ57944308MaRDI QIDQ1590376

Zvi Safra, Edi Karni

Publication date: 21 December 2000

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

social choice theorysocial-alternative lotteriessympathetic impartial observer

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

Hybrid decision model and the ranking of experiments ⋮ Axioms for measuring utility on partial mixture sets ⋮ A generalized representation theorem for Harsanyi's (`impartial') observer ⋮ Subjective expected utility theory with costly actions ⋮ Individual sense of justice and Harsanyi's impartial observer ⋮ The ignorant observer ⋮ A theory of medical decision making under uncertainty ⋮ Fairness and utilitarianism without independence

Cites Work

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• Equilibrium without independence
• Choice under risk and the security factor: an axiomatic model
• Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences
• Additively separable representations on non-convex sets
• Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty: Breaking down backward induction
• Social welfare functions and fairness
• An informationally parsimonious impartial observer theorem
• Individual Sense of Justice: A Utility Representation
• A Definition of Subjective Probability

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