Distributive politics and electoral competition
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1599829
DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2775zbMath1031.91024WikidataQ60680561 ScholiaQ60680561MaRDI QIDQ1599829
Nathalie Picard, Jean-François Laslier
Publication date: 27 February 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2775
Related Items
From Duels to Battlefields: Computing Equilibria of Blotto and Other Games, The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems, Hierarchical models of warfare, All-pay \(2\times 2\) Hex: a multibattle contest with complementarities, The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game, Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto games, Redistributive politics with distortionary taxation, Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics: The continuous strategy case, Sequential, nonzero-sum ``Blotto: allocating defensive resources prior to attack, A Blotto game with incomplete information, Introduction to political science, \(N\)-dimensional Blotto game with heterogeneous battlefield values, An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games, Evolutionary dynamics of resource allocation in the Colonel Blotto game, A topological characterization of the non-emptiness of the banks set and the uncovered set, The multiplayer Colonel Blotto game, A class of \(N\)-player Colonel Blotto games with multidimensional private information, Waging simple wars: a complete characterization of two-battlefield Blotto equilibria, Voting over income taxation, Equilibrium existence for zero-sum games and spatial models of elections, Alternate definitions of the uncovered set and their implications, The lottery Blotto game, Contests with limited resources, The Colonel Blotto game, In Silico Voting Experiments
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Special majority rules and the existence of voting equilibria
- The Minmax Theorem for U.S.C.-L.S.C. payoff functions
- Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
- The bipartisan set of a tournament game
- Tournament solutions and majority voting
- Uncovering some subtleties of the uncovered set: Social choice theory and distributive politics
- Choosing from a weighted tournament
- Dutta's minimal covering set and Shapley's saddles
- Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments
- Comparison functions and choice correspondences
- Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation
- The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
- Budget Deficits and Redistributive Politics