Cycles in team tennis and other paired-element contests

DOI10.3390/g8030027zbMath1410.91209OpenAlexW2733911392MaRDI QIDQ1656945

Justin Ehrlich, James W. Boudreau, Shane D. Sanders

Publication date: 13 August 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030027

zbMATH Keywords

social choice theorystrategic votingsportscompetitive balanceranking cycles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Social choice violations in rank sum scoring: a formalization of conditions and corrective probability computations
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Choosing ``flawed aggregation rules: the benefit of social choice violations in a league that values competitive balance
• The Tennis Coach Problem: A Game-Theoretic and Experimental Study
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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