Technology licensing strategy for network product in a service industry

DOI10.1155/2015/179369zbMath1394.91258OpenAlexW2018360077WikidataQ59117497 ScholiaQ59117497MaRDI QIDQ1664873

Dan Zhao, Haiqing Hu, Shuang Song, Xianpei Hong

Publication date: 27 August 2018

Published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2015/179369

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• On advertising games and spillover in service systems
• Licensing of a quality-improving innovation
• Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
• On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
• Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation
• Milestone Payments or Royalties? Contract Design for R&D Licensing
• Natural Oligopolies
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

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