Exclusive intermediation in unobservable networks

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.011zbMath1419.91078OpenAlexW2901069428MaRDI QIDQ1735768

Itay P. Fainmesser

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.011

zbMATH Keywords

trustcooperationintermediationrobust networkslong-term relationshipssocial capitalgovernancecommunity enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Cooperation in partly observable networked markets ⋮ A cooperative bargaining framework for decentralized portfolio optimization

Cites Work

• Networks of relations and word-of-mouth communication
• Cooperation in partly observable networked markets
• Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria
• Social networks and unraveling in labor markets
• Imperfect monitoring in communication networks
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Network Games
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring
• Cooperation with Network Monitoring
• Pricing Network Effects

This page was built for publication: Exclusive intermediation in unobservable networks