A characterization of polyhedral market games

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Publication:1843383

DOI10.1007/BF01737574zbMath0281.90091OpenAlexW2134230192MaRDI QIDQ1843383

Robert E. Bixby, Billera, Louis J.

Publication date: 1973

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01737574




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