On the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.016zbMath1452.91153OpenAlexW3024199929MaRDI QIDQ2212743

Yehuda John Levy, André Veiga

Publication date: 24 November 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/Media_708537_smxx.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumscreeningperfect competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Actuarial mathematics (91G05)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
• Monopoly and product quality
• An evolutionary model of Bertrand oligopoly
• On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information
• Free entry does not imply zero profits
• A folk theorem for one-shot Bertrand games
• Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
• Informational Equilibrium
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Measurable relations
• Advanced Fixed Point Theory for Economics
• Perfect Competition in Markets With Adverse Selection
• Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance
• Product Design in Selection Markets *
• Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints

This page was built for publication: On the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets