What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2220932
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105120zbMath1457.91268MaRDI QIDQ2220932
Publication date: 25 January 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105120
91B68: Matching models
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