A law of large numbers for weighted plurality

DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0732-4zbMath1291.91069arXiv1106.5423OpenAlexW2963184097MaRDI QIDQ2247943

Joe Neeman

Publication date: 30 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1106.5423

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

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Cites Work

• The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
• Influence and sharp-threshold theorems for monotonic measures
• A law of large numbers for weighted majority
• Correlation inequalities on some partially ordered sets
• A Fourier-theoretic perspective on the Condorcet paradox and Arrow's theorem.
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• An approximate zero-one law
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Social Indeterminacy

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