Tick size, price grids and market performance: stable matches as a model of market dynamics and equilibrium

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.004zbMath1429.91308OpenAlexW2905104507WikidataQ127346293 ScholiaQ127346293MaRDI QIDQ2278907

Richard Roll, Charles R. Plott, Han Son Seo, Hao. Zhao

Publication date: 12 December 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/98101/

zbMATH Keywords

experimentefficiencymatchingassignmentequilibrationprice grid

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68) Financial markets (91G15) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Related Items (1)

Expectational equilibria in many-to-one matching models with contracts

Cites Work

• Price controls, non-price quality competition, and the nonexistence of competitive equilibrium
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes

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